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INTRODUCTION

A "horrible problem."I A "scourge." 2 An "epidemic" for which "failure
is not an option." 3 President Trump is prone to hyperbole. But on March 19,
2018, in Manchester, New Hampshire, his descriptions of the opioid drug
crisis were not hyperbolic assertions divorced from lived experiences; they
instead reflected the view of millions of other Americans and the realities of
modem drug use and addiction.4 Along with those devastating descriptions,
the President also reminded the audience that his administration's approach to
the opioid crisis would neither divert attention from criminal prosecution nor

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Associate Professor of Law, University of
Detroit Mercy. I am grateful to Erin Rodenhouse for her valuable research assistance and
comments. I am a former trial attorney in the Capital Case Unit of the United States Department
of Justice. I have noted references in this Article to litigation in which I was involved, and the
Article does not contain non-public information.
1.
President Donald J. Trump, Remarks on Combatting the Opioid Crisis (Mar. 19,
2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-combattingopioid-crisis.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4.

See Nathaniel Weixel, CDC: Fentanyl is Deadliest Drug in America, THE HILL (Dec.

12, 2018, 9:59 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/420959-cdc-fentanyl-is-deadliestdrug-in-america (showing government research that fentanyl was involved in more overdoses in
2016 than any other drug and that opioids are among the ten deadliest drugs).
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soften criminal punishments for those whose trafficking in opioids results in
another's death. "These are terrible people, and we have to get tough on those
people, because we can have all the Blue Ribbon committees we want, but if
we don't get tough on the drug dealers, we're wasting our time," the President
stated.5 "Just remember that. We're wasting our time. And that toughness
includes the death penalty." 6
And with those comments, the President set in motion yet another
ongoing controversy, this time about the legality and the wisdom of using
capital punishment to address the national opioid crisis.7
Yet important points remained ambiguous after the President's call for
the death penalty. Was he calling for new capital opioid laws, or was he
merely suggesting the use of existing death penalty statutes for drug
traffickers? Public reporting prior to the President's New Hampshire speech
indicated that the White House Domestic Policy Council and the Department
of Justice were actively considering new legislation, including making it a
capital offense to traffic large quantities of fentanyl.I Also, when the President
referred to "big" and "bad" "pushers," 9 did the President intend to focus
federal prosecutorial resources on major traffickers, gangs, and criminal
organizations, or was his reference to "drug dealers" meant to apply to anyone
who distributes drugs like opioids that result in the death of the end user?
Although not reflected precisely in the President's New Hampshire
remarks, the White House later released its plan for combatting the opioid
crisis and stated specifically that the President's opioid initiative will
"strengthen criminal penalties for dealing and trafficking in fentanyl and other
opioids" and that the Justice Department "will seek the death penalty against
drug traffickers, where appropriate under current law."'0 The White House

5.
Trump, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7.
See German Lopez, Read: Jeff Sessions's Memo Asking FederalProsecutorsto Seek
the Death Penalty for Drug Traffickers, Vox (Mar. 21, 2018, 12:40 PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/21/17147580/trump-sessions-death-penaltyopioid-epidemic (discussing emphasis of drug policy experts on other means of addressing the
opioid epidemic contrasted with the President and Attorney General Sessions' punitive
approach).
8. See Katie Zezima & Josh Dawsey, Trump Administration Studies Seeking the Death
Penalty
for
Drug
Dealers,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
9,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/trump-administration-studying-possibility-of-seek
ing-death-penalty-for-drug-dealers/2018/03/09/4d9cc994-23c3-1 1e8-94da-ebf9dl 12159cstor
y.html?noredirect=on&utmterm=.b2c3418f8al3.
9.
Trump, supra note 1.
10. THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP'S INITIATIVE TO STOP OPIOID
ABUSE
AND
REDUCE
DRUG
SUPPLY
AND
DEMAND
(Mar.
19,
2018),
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proposed no new federal death penalty legislation in this document. Indeed,
when the White House released a new fact sheet on the President's initiative
in October 2018, that document retained the same language with respect to
the death penalty for drug traffickers as the March 19, 2018 fact sheet."
Notably, the original initiative was released shortly after the reporting on the
Administration's consideration of new legislative approaches to a federal
death penalty connected to opioid trafficking.' 2 And the amended initiative
was posted shortly after more public reporting that the President had
suggested seeking the death penalty for dealers of large quantities of
fentanyl-reporting that also cited one United States Senator as saying that
such legislation would have to be separated from existing criminal justice
reform efforts in Congress.' 3
The day after the President's New Hampshire speech and release of the
opioid initiative, then Attorney General Jeff Sessions sent a memorandum (the
Memo) to all United States Attorneys to explain the Justice Department's next
steps in implementing the President's initiatives. 14
The Memo directed prosecutors to "consider every lawful tool at their
disposal" to combat the opioid epidemic. '1 In addition to designating opioid
coordinators and seeking criminal and civil penalties for unlawful opioid
manufacturing and distribution, the Memo said that prosecutorial tools
"should also include the pursuit of capital punishment in appropriate cases."16
The Memo did not propose new legislation, but it listed several existing
capital statutes relevant to drug-trafficking crimes, and "strongly
encourage[d] federal prosecutors to use these statutes, when appropriate, to
aid in [the United States'] continuing fight against drug trafficking and the
destruction it causes [the] nation."'

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-initiative-stopopioid-abuse-reduce-drug-supply-demand.
11. See THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP'S INITIATIVE TO STOP OPIOID
ABUSE
AND
REDUCE
DRUG
SUPPLY
AND
DEMAND
(Oct.
24,
2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-initiative-stopopioid-abuse-reduce-drug-supply-demand-2.
12. See Zezima & Dawsey, supra note 8.
13. See Jennifer Jacobs & Steven T. Dennis, Trump Tells Sessions He Favors Death
Penalty for Fentanyl Dealers, BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
23, 2018,
6:41
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-23/trump-is-said-to-propose-deathpenalty-for-fentanyl-dealers.
14. See Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen. to U.S. Attorneys,
Guidance Regarding Use of Capital Punishment in Drug-Related Prosecutions (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1045036/download.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Here, then, is the import of the President's ambiguity: when the White
House said that the Justice Department "will" seek death penalties for drug
traffickers "where appropriate under current law," did that statement mean
that only current federal criminal laws would be employed in doing so, or that
the death notices would have to be appropriate in light of current Justice
Department standards for seeking the death penalty? If the former is true, then
this means that the President's initiative contemplates no new statute. But if
the latter is true, then this means that the Attorney General would simply be
relying on existing standards pursuant to the Department's death penalty
protocol in deciding whether to seek the death penalty in any given case, but
the underlying substantive criminal law that may authorize the death penalty
would not be limited to those already in existence. Indeed, if understood this
way, it is conceivable that federal criminal law could be altered to include a
new statutory scheme that would provide the death penalty for a drug-induced
homicide in which the end user dies from voluntarily ingesting a drug
transferred to him by another.
Such a change would be consistent with a more aggressive movement
among federal prosecutors' offices in addressing the opioid crisis' 8 as well as
the growing popularity of drug-induced homicide laws at the state level,19
some of which permit the imposition of the death penalty.20 However, critics
contend that those laws are too often applied against low-level distributors
who are also addicts or are otherwise closely connected to, and simply shared

18.
(Aug.

See Rod J. Rosenstein, Opinion, Fight Drug Abuse, Don't Subsidize It, N.Y. TIMES
27,

2018),

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/opinion/opioids-heroin-injection-

sites.html (vowing to "aggressively prosecute criminals who supply the deadly poison."). See
generally Rachel L. Rothberg & Kate Stith, The Opioid Crisis and Federal Criminal
Prosecution, 46 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 292, 295-307 (2018) (discussing change in federal
prosecution addressing the opioid crisis).
19. See LINDSAY LASALLE, AN OVERDOSE DEATH IS NOT MURDER: WHY DRUGINDUCED HOMICIDE LAWS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND INHUMANE 2 (2017) (stating that

twenty states have existing drug-induced homicide laws, naming Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming). Some jurisdictions have also enacted legislation that immunizes
those who witness overdoses. Kelsey Bissonnette, Anti-Death Legislation: Fighting Overdose
Mortalityfrom a Public Health Perspective, 23 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 451, 460 (2014).
20. According to the Drug Policy Alliance report, these include COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-1.3-401 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 71st General Assembly
(2018)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West, Westlaw through the 2018 2d Reg. Sess. of the 25th
Leg.); and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.9 (West, Westlaw through legislation of the 2d Reg.
Sess. of the 56th Leg. (2018)); LASALLE, supra note 19, at 56-60. See also N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:1(f) (West, Westlaw through Chapter 379 of the 2018 Reg. Sess., and C.A.C.R. 15
and 16). This list does not include those states that could use their generic homicide laws to
prosecute a drug-induced death and that otherwise allow for imposition of the death penalty.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/5

4

Broughton: The Opioid Crisis and the Federal Death Penalty
2019]

THE OPIOID CRISIS AND THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

615

the drug with, the victim. 2' Consequently, adopting this approach would force
Congress, the President, and the Justice Department to make critical policy
choices about which drug distributors would be the targets of such legislation
and eventual prosecutions, and which distributors would bear sufficient
culpability to warrant capital punishment.
The opioid crisis which involves a complicated mix of social, medical,
psychological, business, and legal elements, as well as the interests of victims
and their families, the health care community, the legal community, and the
pharmaceutical community is far too complex to address comprehensively
in this short Article. Therefore, his Article analyzes only a small, but
important, fragment of the legal debate related to the crisis.
In particular, this Article addresses the significance of these two distinct
but interconnected elements of the Trump Administration's prosecutorial
approach to the opioid crisis-the President's announcement of his stated
opioid policy initiatives and the Memo-evaluating their meaning for lawyers
and policymakers on the front lines of opioid prosecution and legislation. I
give special attention to use of the federal death penalty by first examining the
Sessions Death Penalty Memo and considering its meaning and significance
in light of existing law and Justice Department policy in capital cases. I then
explain that Congress could lawfully craft a new capital statute targeting
opioid trafficking resulting in death but doing so would also raise a number
of difficult legal issues, including potential culpability issues pursuant to both
the Eighth Amendment and the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA). I conclude
that, while a strategy of aggressive criminal prosecution and punishment will
not alone provide an answer to the national opioid problem, federal
prosecution-including the possibility of death penalty authorization in rare
but appropriate cases-should nonetheless play an important role in a
comprehensive plan of counter-opioid action across government agencies.
II.

THE MEMO

The Memo appears, at first, to look like a directive to federal prosecutors
to seek the death penalty in cases involving death resulting from certain drug
trafficking crimes. Indeed, that is the way that the news media characterized
it. That reading, however, misunderstands federal criminal law and Justice
Department policy in federal death penalty cases. The Memo is better

21.

See LASALLE, supra note 19, at 3; see also Valena E. Beety, The Overdose/Homicide

Epidemic, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 983, 984 (2018) (citing LASALLE, supra note 19, at 3) (noting
that, in rural areas, the "vast majority" of drug-induced homicide prosecutions involve a
distributor who is "simply a friend or acquaintance who shared the drug with the deceased").
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understood as a reminder to federal prosecutors about the seriousness with
which the Department is taking these death-resulting drug crimes, as well as
the seriousness of the opioid crisis more broadly. But it should also be
understood as seeking to achieve one-and perhaps two-other goals:
encouraging federal prosecutors to recommend the death penalty more often
in drug-related cases, and perhaps, appeasing the "audience of one."
A.

Understandingthe Directive to FederalProsecutors

The Memo says that the Attorney General "strongly encourage[s] federal
prosecutors to use [the capital drug trafficking] statutes, when appropriate, to
aid in our continuing fight against drug trafficking and the destruction it
causes in our nation."2 2 The statutes cited include the Violent Crimes in Aid
of Racketeering (VICAR) statute, which punishes, among other things,
murder in aid of racketeering activity (which can include drug trafficking);23
the firearm enhancement statute, which punishes using or carrying a firearm
during or in relation to, or possession of a firearm in furtherance of, a federal
drug trafficking crime; 24 the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute,
which targets those who are principal administrators, organizers, or leaders of
large-scale drug trafficking organizations; 25 and the drug kingpin provisions
of the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), which allows the Government to
seek the death penalty for a CCE-related offense under specific conditions
involving very high quantities of drugs or attempts to kill a public officer,
juror, or witness, or their family members, in order to obstruct a prosecution
or investigation into an enterprise offense. 26 Although the other statutes
require that death result from the predicate drug offense, the drug kingpin
provision of the FDPA section 3591(b)-does not. Also, special statutory
aggravating factors apply to a section 3591(b) prosecution. 27
After the Memo's release, many in the news media characterized it as
urging federal prosecutors to seek the death penalty in drug-related homicides.
"Following Trump's Lead, Sessions Urges Federal Prosecutors to Seek the

22. Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen. to U.S. Attorneys, supra
note 14.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) (2012). But see United States v. Conyers, 227 F. Supp. 3d 280
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (invalidating provision for mandatory life sentence under VICAR, as applied
to juvenile defendants).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (j) (2012), partially recognized as unconstitutional in United
States v. Neihart, 2018 WL 6131772 (10th Cir. 2018).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b), (c), (e) (2012), partially repealed by Pub. L. 109-177, Title II
§ 221(2), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 231.
26. 18 U.S.C. §3591(b) (2012).
27. Id. § 3592(d).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/5
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Death Penalty Against Major Drug Dealers," read the headline in the Los
Angeles Times.28 A piece in the National Review was titled, "Sessions
Instructs Prosecutors to Seek Death Penalty for Drug Dealers." 29 Salon touted
the Memo this way: "Jeff Sessions to Prosecutors: Seek Death Penalty for
Drug Dealers." 30
This characterization, however, is not entirely accurate. Contrary to the
interpretation implicit in these attention-grabbing and surely well-meaning
headlines, the language from the Memo cannot be a directive to United States
Attorneys to unilaterally seek the death penalty, or even to seek it after internal
office review in the district. Pursuant to the Justice Department's death
penalty protocol, only the Attorney General can authorize the government to
seek the death penalty in a federal criminal case. 3' United States Attorneys
can merely recommend that the Department seek (or not seek) the death
penalty after submitting the case to the Capital Review Committee for Main
Justice review. 32
Thus, the Attorney General's choice of the word "use" to describe an action
related to the capital drug trafficking statutes cannot have the meaning that
has been ascribed to it. Instead, the Memo is better understood as reminding
the United States Attorneys to be cognizant of these statutes and their
importance to the Administration's policy goals with respect to the opioid
crisis.
Pursuant to the Memo, then, United States Attorneys should be prepared
to seek indictments for offenses using these statutes in cases where the facts
satisfy the requisite elements and to pursue capital prosecution where the
Attorney General authorizes them.
But even this is an odd reminder. First, federal prosecutors presumably
are already cognizant of the death penalty components of these offenses. And
second, federal prosecutors must already submit cases to the Attorney
General's Review Committee for Capital Cases where there is the possibility

28. Joseph Tanfani, Following Trump's Lead, Sessions Urges FederalProsecutors to
Seek the Death Penalty Against Major Drug Dealers, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-sessions-death-penalty-20180321 -story.html.
29. Jack Crowe, Sessions Instructs Prosecutorsto Seek Death Penaltyfor Drug Dealers,
NAT'L REV. (Mar. 21, 2018, 5:10 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/sessionsinstructs-prosecutors-to-seek-death-penalty-for-drug-dealers.
30. Matthew Rozsa, Jeff Sessions to Prosecutors:Seek Death Penaltyfor Drug Dealers,
SALON (Mar. 21, 2018, 6:53 PM), https://www.salon.com/2018/03/21/jeff-sessions-toprosecutors-seek-death-penalty-for-drug-dealers.
31.

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

JUSTICE,

U.S.

ATTORNEYS'

MANUAL

§ 9-10.050,

https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9- 10000-capital-crimes (last updated Apr. 2014).
32. See generally id. § 9-10.000 (last updated Apr. 2018).
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of a federal death penalty.33 So regardless of the United States Attorney's
recommendation (to seek or not to seek), every case in which the death penalty
could be sought must be submitted to Main Justice in Washington for review.
Even if the United States Attorney believes that the death penalty should be
sought, the Attorney General can refuse to authorize it.3 4

As such, the Memo should not be interpreted as requiring United States
Attorneys to unilaterally issue notices of intent to seek the death penalty in
drug-related prosecutions. Rather, it should be read in conjunction with the
existing Justice Department death penalty protocol, in which all death-eligible
cases receive Main Justice review and which permits only the Attorney
General to authorize capital punishment in a given case-and then, only after
a careful review of the facts and circumstances underlying the individual
case.35

B.

Objectives of the Memo

Rather than serve to displace existing protocol review and arm United
States Attorneys with unilateral death-authorization powers in drug cases, the
Memo was likely designed to achieve other objectives.
First, the tone of the Memo-an aggressive prosecutorial posture toward
drug trafficking, generally, 36 and toward drug trafficking resulting in death,
specifically makes clear to federal prosecutors that the Administration takes
the federal death penalty seriously as an option in these cases. Moreover, the
Memo should be understood in the larger context of Administration policy on
the death penalty generally, reflecting a preference for more robust use of
capital punishment. 37

33. See id. § 9-10.050-10.060 (last updated Apr. 2014).
34. Id § 9-10.050.
35. See id. § 9-10.030 (last updated June 2007).
36. See Rosenstein, supra note 18.
37. See Jim Mustian, Under Trump, Federal Death Penalty Cases are Ticking Up,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Oct.
31,
2018),
https://www.apnews.com/20bb9bfc95
4248bda8bl3b4a4240adad (noting that, under Attorney General Sessions, the Justice
Department has sought the death penalty in at least a dozen cases in less than two years and
noting a "near moratorium" on authorizations in the second term of the Obama Administration);
see also Mark Berman, The Justice Dept. is Seeking its FirstFederalDeath Sentences Under
Sessions
and Expects
More
to
Follow,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
9,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/01/09/the-justice-department-isseeking-its-first-federal-death-sentences-under-sessions-and-expects-more-to-follow/?utmte
rm=.51bf368e1863 (discussing Justice Department expectations of more federal death penalty
authorizations).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/5
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With these contexts in mind, and understanding that United States
Attorneys already have an obligation to submit for review any possible federal
death penalty case, United States Attorneys' Offices may be more likely to
recommend the death penalty in a greater number of drug-related cases.
Although the Attorney General need not agree with the United States
Attorney's recommendation, his decision to seek the death penalty in a given
case may be less complicated where he and the United States Attorney are in
agreement about pursuing capital punishment. The Department would be
speaking with one voice about the death penalty for a particular defendant,
and this could mitigate any tensions that might otherwise exist, or be created,
between Main Justice and the relevant district.
Second, the Memo may also have been designed to appease the so-called
"audience of one"-the President. 38 The President, on multiple occasions, has
made no secret of his affinity for capital punishment, though his public
statements on the death penalty have at times been intemperate, misinformed,
and poorly timed. 9 He also made no secret of his disdain for Attorney General
Sessions, specifically, and for the Justice Department more generally. 40 in

38. This phenomenon has been reported with respect to various figures associated with
President Trump, seeking his attention or approval. See, e.g., Daniel D'Addario, The Kavanaugh
Hearings Were Pitched at One Viewer - Trump, VARIETY (Sept. 27, 2018, 4:23 PM),
https: //variety.com/2018/tv/columns/brett-kavanaugh-christine-blasey-ford-trump- 1202960
433; Paul Kane, Focus is on an Audience of One - Trump - to Prevail with House GOP, WASH.
POST (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/focus-is-on-an-audience-ofone--trump--to-prevail-with-house-gop/2018/01/26/76ae4836-02cO- 11 e8-8acf-ad2991367d9d
story.html?utm-term=.74b0b7206935; James Poniewozik, Sean Spicer's Briefings, Cringe TV
for
an
Audience
of
One,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
10,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/arts/television/sean-spicer-donald-trump-melissa-mcca
rthy.html; Darren Samuelsohn, Ty Cobb's Audience of One in the Trump-Russia Probe,
POLITICO (Jan. 26, 2018, 7:40 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/26/ty-cobb-trumpwhite-house-russia-lawyer-373194.
39. See J. Richard Broughton, The FederalDeath Penalty, Trumpism, and Civil Rights
Enforcement, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1611, 1622-27 (2018) (discussing President Trump's often
troubling and ill-considered public remarks on the death penalty before and during his
presidency).
40. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (Jul. 25, 2017, 3:12 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/889790429398528000 (accusing Sessions of being
"VERY weak" on Hillary Clinton's potential criminal activity); Donald J. Trump
(@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (Jul. 24, 2017, 5:49 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonald
Trump/status/889467610332528641 (referring to Sessions as "our beleaguered A.G."); see also
Avery Anapol, Trump: Many People are Disappointedin the Justice Department, "Including
Me",
HILL
(Nov.
3,
2017,
10:01
AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/
administration/3 58600-trump-lots-of-people-are-disappointed-in-justice-department-including
(reporting that the President told a group of reporters "a lot of people are disappointed in the
Justice Department, including me"); Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump
Humiliated Jeff Sessions After Mueller Appointment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017),

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 5
620

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 7 0: 611

light of this strained relationship, the Attorney General's Memo could, in
addition to other motives, also have been a way of regaining the confidence
of the President by showing the Attorney General's steadfast commitment to
the President's publicly-stated goal of pursuing the death penalty for drug
traffickers. 41 Although Attorney General Sessions resigned at the President's
request in November 2018 and was eventually replaced by now-Attomey
General William Barr, there is no indication yet that General Barr will alter
the guidance set forth in the Memo. 42
It is important, then, that the Memo does not alter the existing death
penalty protocol, empower United States Attorneys to unilaterally seek the
death penalty, or signal that the Department will uncritically pursue capital
punishment in every case involving death resulting from a drug trafficking
crime. Nonetheless, consistent with the evidence suggesting that the Trump
Administration has thus far favored robust use of the federal death penalty, 43
it is sensible to view the Memo as a signal to federal prosecutors that pursuing
the death penalty in drug-related cases would be in line with general Justice
Department attitudes-and those of the President toward capital
punishment.
III. IMAGINING A FEDERAL CAPITAL DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE LAW

If the Trump Administration's policy is to pursue capital punishment in
drug-related cases, then that policy would best be effected by a focus on the
most culpable drug offenders-those whose crimes are sufficiently

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/us/politics/jeff-sessions-trump.html (reporting that the
President berated Sessions and "said he should resign" after Sessions recused himself from the
Russian meddling investigation).
41. Public reporting suggested a similar notion with respect to Attorney General
Sessions' public remarks on leaks within the Administration. See Josh Gerstein, Sessions'Broad
Attack on Leaks Aimed at Audience of One: Trump, POLITICO (Aug. 4, 2017, 6:53 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/04/trump-jeff-sessions-leaks-media-241334
("Sessions' eight-minute broadside against leaks and stern warning to leakers seemed to aimed
at trying to repair his badly frayed relationship with Trump .... ).
42. See generally David Jackson & Kevin Johnson, PresidentTrump to Nominate Former
Attorney General William Barr to Replace JeffSessions, USA TODAY (Dec. 7, 2018, 3:41 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/12/07/donald-trump-william-barr-attorney
-general/2231211002. Between November 2017 and December 2018, the Justice Department
rescinded numerous guidance documents, but the Sessions Death Penalty Memo was not among
them. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Acting Attorney General Whitaker Announces
Justice Department Rescission of 69 Guidance Documents (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/acting-attorney-general-whitaker-rescinds-69-guidance-docu
ments.
43. See Mustian, supra note 37.
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aggravated and insufficiently mitigated to warrant serious death penalty
consideration. The existing statutes, noted in the Memo, provide a legal basis
for targeting such actors. 44 But Congress could also craft a capital opioid
trafficking statute not already in existence, and not among those outlined in
the Sessions Memo, that imposes the possibility of capital punishment for
manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing an opioid resulting in death and
do so consistently with traditional principles of criminal law and with existing
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Of course, such a law could prove
undesirable, even counter-productive. Numerous commentators, including
those in the legal academic community, have criticized the use of druginduced homicide prosecutionS 45 and outlined a variety of legal challenges to
them. 46 Further, the idea of capital punishment for such a crime has drawn

special disapproval. 47 A federal drug-induced homicide law that imposes the
death penalty would surely face significant criticism, opposition, and
litigation hurdles. Moreover, creating such a law may not ultimately result in
more death sentences, or even capital prosecution authorizations, and thus,
might not ultimately serve a policy of more robust use of the federal death
penalty in drug cases.
A.

Modelsfor a New FederalCapitalDrug-InducedHomicide Law

Recall that the President's remarks from March 19, 2018, identified "drug
dealers" as the object of his attacks. 48 It is unclear to what kind of drug
distributor this refers: perhaps only those associated with gangs and other
criminal organizations, or perhaps any significant seller. 49 Public reporting
suggests that the President has shown interest in death penalty legislation that
reaches opioids specifically, 0 but it remains unclear who, exactly, the targets
of that legislation would be. The Memo could create the impression that

44.
45.
46.

See sources cited supra notes 23-26.
LASALLE, supra note 19, at 2-4; Beety, supra note 21, at 1004-05.
See generally Valena Beety et al., Drug-Induced Homicide Defense Toolkit (Ohio
State
Pub.
Law
Working
Paper
No.
467),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3265510 (outlining several legal grounds
for challenging the use of drug-induced homicide laws).
47. See Nina Bala & Arthur Rizer, Trump's Death Penaltyfor Drug Dealers Proposalis
Bad Policy, BALT. SUN (Apr. 5, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
opinion/oped/bs-ed-op-0406-dealer-death-20180404-story.html.
48. See Trump, supra note 1.
49. See id. (referring to punishing "the big pushers" and "the death penalty for the really
bad pushers and abusers").
50. See Jacobs & Dennis, supra note 13.
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federal criminal law already addresses the interests that the President
identifies."
But this depends upon the nature of the drug-related death and the target
of the prosecution. The President's New Hampshire speech indicated a focus
on what the President referred to as "the big pushers" and "the really bad
pushers and abusers." 5 2 Perhaps, then, the Administration is interested in
targeting for capital prosecution those involved in gangs or criminal
organizations, or who are relatively moderate- to high-level traffickers or
regular street-level soldiers who combine drug transactions with guns and
threats of violence or with maintaining or increasing position in a criminal
organization. If so, then the existing federal criminal law set forth in the
Memo the firearms enhancement, VICAR, the CCE statute, and the Drug
Kingpin provision of the FDPA is likely adequate.53
Consider the simplest case involving the kind of scenario that has
produced so much disdain from critics of drug-induced homicide
prosecutions: the case of a bilateral opioid exchange in which a seller or
distributor-often not a gang member nor a seller connected to a criminal
organization5 4 transfers the drug to a buyer or user who ingests the drug,
resulting in the buyer's or user's death, typically without any intent to kill on
the part of the seller/distributor. The victim dies from his or her own overdose
or ingestion of the drug not from the distributor's gunshot or other violence,
or from any design to cause death. That scenario is likely captured by existing
federal law" but not by any existing federal death penalty provision.
Consequently, there is a gap in existing federal statutes that impose the
death penalty for drug-related crimes. The practical effect of that gap is to
exempt from federal capital prosecution those distributors unconnected to a
drug trafficking or racketeering enterprise and without any specific intent to
kill who transfer a drug to someone who, in turn, dies from the voluntary
use of the drug. Perhaps that is a sensible omission. But if Congress and the
President are interested in capital-level accountability for this particular
category of "drug dealer," then Congress and the President could craft
legislation to fill this gap, at least where the defendant acted with subjective
fault as to the risk to human life that his drug/opioid distribution created. Also,

51. Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen. to U.S. Attorneys, supra
note 14.
52. See Trump, supra note 1.
53. See Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen. to U.S. Attorneys,
supra note 14.
54. See Beety, supra note 21, at 984 (citing LASALLE, supra note 19, at 3).
55. See 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(B) (2012).
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presumably, the actor would need to be among the "big pushers" to which the
President referred.
In doing so, Congress could look to the experience of the States and to
the general principles of criminal law. At least twenty states have druginduced homicide statutes.5 6 Of those, capital punishment is available in
multiple jurisdictions. 1 These statutes have faced legal challenges but have
consistently been validated by state courts." Moreover, drug-induced
homicide prosecutions whether using generic homicide law or legislation
specific to the drug-induced death tend to be based on well-established
criminal law principles derived from the depraved heart murder rule (i.e., an
act of reckless indifference to human life that results in death), the felony rule
(death resulting from the commission or attempted commission of a felony),
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, and principles of complicity.59
Consistent with this approach, and with the unique structure of federal
criminal law, 60 Congress has already approved multiple drug-induced
homicide statutes. In setting forth the penalties pursuant to the core drug
offense statute, 61 Congress provided for a series of punishments where death
results from the commission of the core offense but which were specific as to
the schedule or identity and amount of the drug. For example, Congress
provided for imprisonment for twenty years to life imprisonment for
committing a core offense involving a range of serious drugs where "death or
serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance . . . ."62 The

56. See LASALLE, supra note 19, at 2.
57. Id. at 8.
58. See, e.g., People v. Boand, 838 N.E.2d 367, 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Lofthouse v.
Commonwealth, 13 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Ky. 2000); State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1189
(N.J. 1994); Commonwealth v. Kakhankham, 132 A.3d 986, 992 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
59. See LASALLE, supra note 19, at 2.
60. Although the common law is sometimes used to inform the meaning of a federal
criminal statute, there is no federal common law of crimes. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32, 32, 34 (1812). Although there is a general murder statute in federal criminal law,
punishment pursuant to that statute applies only where the crime is committed in the special
maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States-and drug trafficking is not enumerated
as a predicate crime for purposes of the federal felony murder provisions. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 111 1(a)-(b) (2012). Therefore, the overwhelming majority of federal homicides involve
statutes, other than § 1111 murder, that provide an enhanced penalty for death resulting from the
commission of some predicate crime. Essentially, then, most federal homicide law is a statutory
variation of felony murder law. The offense, however, is not literally described as a "murder,"
unless committed under § 1111. See id.
61. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012) (making it a crime to "manufacture, distribute,
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance").
"Distribute" means "deliver" and does not require a sale. Id. § 802(11) (2012); United States v.
Wallace, 532 F.3d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).
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sentence is enhanced to mandatory life imprisonment if the defendant has a
prior final conviction for a felony drug offense. 63 Congress also provided for
twenty years to life if death results from the use of the substance and the drug
is a schedule I or II controlled substance, or is gamma hydroxybutyric acid or
a gram of flunitrazepam. 64 The sentence increases to thirty years to life with
a serious drug offense prior conviction.65
Yet none of these death-resulting statutes imposes the death penalty.
Congress could simply amend the existing statute to provide that where death
results, the defendant may be punished by death or life in prison or a (specific)
term of years. Further, Congress could also narrow the death penalty provision
by identifying a specific opioid that resulted in the death of the victim for
example, where death results from the distribution of fentanyl or a mixture of
fentanyl and another drug (like heroin). A version of this kind of legislation
was proposed in the House in 2016, but it received no action. 66
Among other challenges, causation could remain a contested issue in a
given case employing section 841(b). In Burrage v. United States, 67 the
Supreme Court held that section 841(b)(1)(c) requires proof of but-for
causation in a case of drug distribution resulting in death.68 That case involved
a victim who had consumed a cocktail of drugs (including marijuana and
oxycodone), which included the heroin that Burrage had provided. 69 There,
the Court found that the Government failed to prove but-for causation, as the
medical testimony could not establish that the victim would have survived had
he not ingested the heroin.70 The Court did not, however, address whether the

63. Id.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
65. Id.
66. See H.R. 6158, 114th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2016). The bill, which would have amended
section 841(b), would have provided for the possibility of capital punishment where the
underlying drug offense involved a mixture of heroin and fentanyl and where "death or serious
bodily injury results from the use of such substance . . . ."Id.
67. 571 U.S. 204 (2014).
68. Id. at 218-19.
69. Id. at 206.
70. Id at 207, 219. For discussion of the significance of Burrage generally, see Eric A.
Johnson, Cause-in-FactAfter Burrage v. United States, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1727 (2016). For
treatment of Burrage in the opioid context, see Beety, supra note 2 1, at 984-85 (citing Burrage,
571 U.S. at 212-18); Judge Stephanie Domitrovich & Jeffrey M. Jentzen, Best Practicesand
Recommendations:Judicialand MedicalPerspectiveson CasesInvolving Addiction to Opioids,
57 No. 1 JUDGES' J. 24, 26-27 (2018); Alyssa M. McClure, Illegitimate Overprescription:How
Burrage v. United States is Hindering Punishment of Physicians and Bolstering the Opioid
Epidemic, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1747, 1749 (2018).
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statute also required proximate (or legal) causation," though federal courts
have consistently held that section 841(b) does not require it.72
Even if Congress desires a federal capital statute for drug-induced
homicides that cover ground not already covered by the statutes detailed in
the Memo, it is unnecessary for Congress to craft an entirely new statute.
Congress could simply amend section 841 to include the availability of capital
punishment for a death-resulting offense.
B.

Culpability and the Eighth Amendment

In addition to creating questions about the meaning and reach of the
applicable statute, any congressional effort to create capital liability for a
drug-induced death will also raise potential questions about whether
imposition of the death penalty is constitutionally proportionate, based on
notions of culpability that could be related to the degree of participationespecially in light of the victim's voluntary conduct-or even attenuated
causation.
The easier case is one in which the distributor or direct transferor of the
opioid gives the drug to the victim and the victim dies. Though easier, it is not
uncomplicated because the victim has presumably ingested the drugs
voluntarily. But even more complicated questions arise when the defendant is
not the person who directly provided the opioid that produced the death. For
example, assume that Walter provides a supply of opioids to Jesse, who then
distributes the drug to Jane, who dies. We have already discussed Jesse's
liability. But what about Walter's? Assume further that Walter manufactures
a drug laced with an opioid, such as fentanyl. Walter transfers the supply to
Jesse, who then transfers a small amount of his larger supply to Pete, who then
distributes to Jane, who dies. Who is responsible for Jane's death?
In each scenario, we can imagine a result in which the criminal law would
be implicated. For example, Walter and Jesse may be responsible based on
principles of complicity, either for assisting the crime that resulted in Jane's
death or as co-conspirators with Pete, using conventional Pinkerton liability
principles: guilt for any substantive crime committed by any member of the

71.
LAW

Burrage, 571 U.S. at 210 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL

§ 6.4(a) (2d ed. 2003)).

72. The Toolkit authors acknowledge that federal courts have not read section 841(b) to
require proximate causation, but they urge defense counsel to request a proximate cause
instruction in order to preserve the issue. See Beety et al., supra note 46, at 19.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 5
626

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 7 0: 611

conspiracy, where reasonably foreseeable and within the conspiracy's
scope. 73

Yet in both the simpler example and the more complicated one involving
defendants who are somewhat attenuated from the transaction between the
direct distributor and the victim, once we include capital punishment as part
of the equation, questions of culpability arise that could trigger litigation about
whether the death penalty is a constitutionally proportionate punishment for
the crime.
The Supreme Court has placed a number of categorical limits on the
power of the government to impose the death penalty where the Court has
deemed that punishment to be disproportionate to the crime or to the
culpability of the individual defendant. 74 More specifically, these Eighth
Amendment proportionality principles have been applied to defendants when
the prosecution is based on a theory of felony murder or complicity.7' These
opioid-induced homicides raise potential questions about whether the
defendant is sufficiently culpable for the resulting death to justify imposition
of the death penalty. In the case of drug sellers, one may sensibly argue that
they do not intend to kill killing the person who buys one's product is bad
for business. In the case of those even further removed from the victim (such
as Walter and Jesse above), those defendants would likely argue that their
culpability is reduced by the sheer distance from the death-resulting conduct.
And in both cases, the defendants could argue that the victim's own conductthat is, voluntarily engaging in the conduct that results in the death not only
mitigates the offense but precludes the death penalty as a matter of
constitutional law. These are considerable problems, but they are ultimately
not insurmountable obstacles.
In Enmund v. Florida,76 the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the death penalty could be imposed upon a defendant, Earl Enmund,
who was a passenger in the vehicle that was used to arrive at and flee the scene

73. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946) (first quoting Hyde v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912); then quoting United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601,
608 (1910)).
74. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 469 (2008) (holding that the death
penalty was disproportionate punishment for aggravated rape of either adult or child); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the death penalty was disproportionate
punishment for defendant who committed murder before age 18); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 321 (2002) (holding that the death penalty was disproportionate for killer who was mentally
disabled); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (holding that the death penalty was
disproportionate for the rape of adult woman).
75. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 797-800 (1982).
76. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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of a murder that occurred in the course of a robbery.7 7 Enmund was prosecuted
for first-degree murder, essentially on a felony murder theory combined with
Florida's complicity law. 7 Although Enmund remained in the vehicle while
Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong entered the home of two elderly victims,
killing and robbing them, the jury found that Enmund was a constructively
present aider and abettor. 79 This was enough to bring him within Florida's
first-degree capital murder law as a first-degree principal.so
Following its now-familiar two-pronged capital proportionality analysis
under the Eighth Amendment," the Court first surveyed the legislative
landscape and concluded that the objective legislative evidence weighed
against permitting the death penalty for a defendant who does not personally
kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill.82 The Court then stated that, regardless
of the objective evidence, in its own judgment the death penalty is
disproportionate for a defendant who does not personally kill, intend to kill,
or attempt to kill.83 Considering Enmund's culpability only as to the
underlying robbery, his culpability did not extend to the killings perpetrated
by the Armstrongs and the Eighth Amendment did not permit the two acts to
be treated the same. 84 Robbery, the Court noted, is a serious crime, but it does
not equate to murder." Consequently, the Eighth Amendment bars the death
penalty for those like Enmund, whose participation in, and culpability for, the
predicate crime does not extend to the ensuing homicide. 86
Following this Eighth Amendment reasoning, one could argue that the
distributor of an opioid that results in death is culpable, only for the drug
distribution but not the death. Whether criminal liability is predicated on a
traditional felony-murder theory, a "death-resulting" statute, or complicity,
the defendant can plausibly argue that his connection to the ensuing death is

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 788.
at 785 (citations omitted).
at 784-85.
(citing Enmund v. State, 399 So.2d 1362, 1371-72 (Fla. 1981), rev'd, 458 U.S.

782).
81. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (quoting Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)) (employing framework that first considers objective indicia
of societal attitudes toward the death penalty practice at issue, then, regardless of objective
indicia, considers Court's "own judgment" in independently determining acceptability of the
practice under the Eighth Amendment); see also J. Richard Broughton, Kennedy and the Tail of
Minos, 69 LA. L. REV. 593 (2009) (criticizing the two-prong capital proportionality framework).
82. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792-93 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1978)).
83. Id. at 798.
84. Id. at 797-98 (first quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976); then quoting
Coker, 433 U.S. at 598).
85. Id. at 797 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 598)).
86. Id. at 798.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

17

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 5
628

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 7 0: 611

sufficiently attenuated and that he lacks the kind of culpability that the
Enmund Court envisioned for imposition of capital punishment. That is, he
did not personally kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill (attempted murder, of
course, usually requires the specific intent to kill). 17
That is a problematic constitutional argument. In Enmund, discussing the
penological value of deterrence as it relates to the Eighth Amendment's
coverage, the Court specifically stated that "[i]t would be very different if the
likelihood of a killing in the course of a robbery were so substantial that one
should share the blame for the killing if he somehow participated in the
felony."" There, the Court determined that the evidence showed only a slight
chance of a homicide resulting from a robbery, negating the deterrence value
of the death penalty.89 However, the Court appeared open to a capital
punishment regime for perpetrators of predicate crimes where an ensuing
death seems more foreseeable or likely.
Five years after Enmund, the Court decided Tison v. Arizona,90 which
further clarified the opening left by Enmund. Brothers Ricky, Raymond, and
Donald Tison helped their father, Gary, and another inmate, Randy
Greenawalt, escape from an Arizona prison by arming them with weapons
smuggled into the facility in an ice chest. 91 On the run in the Arizona desert
and stranded with a disabled vehicle, the brothers, their father, and Greenawalt
flagged down a passing motorist, John Lyons, who stopped to help and was
traveling with his wife, two-year-old son, and fifteen-year-old niece. 92 After
Raymond and Donald drove the disabled car farther into the desert with the
Lyons family in the backseat the Lyons family was ordered to stand in the
headlights of the vehicle. 9 Sometime thereafter, after John Lyons begged for
his life, and after Gary told his sons to go for water at the Lyons's vehicle,
Gary and Greenawalt killed the Lyons family with shotguns. 94
Ricky and Raymond Tison were later convicted of capital murder
pursuant to a felony murder theory (using kidnapping and robbery as predicate
felonies) and a complicity theory. 95 They were sentenced to death and

87. See id at 797.
88. Id at 799.
89. Id at 799-800 (footnote omitted).
90. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
91. Id at 139.
92. Id at 139-40.
93. Id at 140.
94. Id at 140-41 (citing to the record on appeal).
95. Id at 141 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (1956), repealedby Laws 1977,
Ch. 142, § 15; and then citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-139 (1956), repealedby Laws 1977,
Ch. 142, § 2). Donald was killed during an eventual standoff with police. Id Gary Tison escaped
into the desert, "where he died of exposure." Id
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challenged their death sentences pursuant to Enmund.96 The Supreme Court
rejected the challenges. 97
According to the Court, even though the Tison brothers did not personally
kill any member of the Lyons family, nor attempt to do so, nor possess an
intent to kill, Enmund did not protect them. 98 In Enmund, the Court was
concerned with actors at two distinct extremes: one, a minor actor, not at the
scene of the killing, who lacked a culpable mental state as to the killing; and
the other, a felony murderer who actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted
to kill. 99 Although the Tison brothers did not personally kill, or attempt or
intend to kill, they were not minor actors without a culpable mental state.
Rather, they fell into an "intermediate"' or "midrange" category of
culpability for a felony murder:1 02 they were "major" participants in the
underlying felonies, and the record "would support a finding of the culpable
mental state of reckless indifference to human life."' 03
Justice O'Connor's opinion described the recklessness standard as
"implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave
risk of death," and thus, "represent[ing] a highly culpable mental state" that
may be considered in the capital sentencing decision when that conduct
"causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result."1 04 This
combination of factors major participation in a felony and reckless
indifference to human life, which was sufficient for malice under the common
law of murder and which the Court said "may be every bit as shocking to the
moral sense as an 'intent to kill "'-105 is sufficient to satisfy the Eighth
Amendment's culpability threshold.
Enmund and Tison, of course, appear to be narrowly concerned with
proportionality based on culpability as measured by the combination of mens
rea and the level of participation in the predicate conduct. They are not really
causation cases. Yet these would seem the most likely cases to cite in a
situation where the defendant's reduced culpability is measured by attenuated
causation. The trouble with such an argument, however, is that neither
Enmund nor Tison, nor the other proportionality cases, indicate what level of

96. Id at 143 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)).
97. Id at 143-45 (citing State v. Tison, 690 P.2d 747, 757-59 (Ariz. 1984), vacated by
Tison, 481 U.S. at 158).
98. Id at 150-51.
99. Id at 149-50.
100. Id. at 151-52.
101. Id. at 152.
102. Id. at 155.
103. Id. at 151.
104. Id. at 157-58.
105. Id
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causation would be required to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. After all, major
participation in a felony combined with at least reckless indifferencecould encompass a culpable defendant with some distance from the killing.
Neither case appears to suggest that proximate causation would be necessary
for constitutionally sufficient culpability.
In the case of a drug-induced homicide in which the end user voluntarily
ingested the drug/opioid, Enmund and Tison could thus be read to favor the
prosecution on an Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge. First, in the
case of the direct distributor of the drug, if that person is deemed to be the
"actual killer," then resort to Tison is unnecessary. Enmund, at least on its
face, appears to allow the death penalty for the one who actually kills, even if
he did not intend to kill.1 06 Even if the direct distributor is not deemed to be
the "actual killer," but is nevertheless criminally responsible under the
applicable criminal law on a felony murder or complicity theory, then Tison
could be applied so long as the Government can demonstrate reckless
indifference.' 0 7 The same argument would apply to those further removed
from the killing but whose participation in the underlying criminal activity
that led to it was deemed to be "major" and who similarly possessed the kind
of reckless indifference that the Tison Court described an appreciation of the
grave risk of death as a natural consequence of the underlying criminal
conduct. 108

These are, of course, case-by-case assessments of culpability and would
not attach to every defendant in a case with a drug-induced death. This is only
to say that Eighth Amendment proportionality principles would not pose an
insurmountable obstacle in cases involving a limited class of defendants who
had significant roles in the underlying criminal activity that led to the death
and who, likely because of the nature of the drug/opioid, could anticipate the
grave risk if not the likelihood of the end user's death.1 09
Enmund and Tison are therefore imperfect precedents, even for a
defendant who did not intend to kill and whose causal connection to an opioidrelated death is attenuated for example, a supplier, a distributor onceremoved, or a manufacturer. And Tison's reckless indifference standard

106. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). This understanding of the EnmundTison rule has drawn criticism. See Guyora Binder et al., CapitalPunishment of Unintentional
Felony Murder, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141 (2017); Joseph Trigilio & Tracy Casadio,
Executing Those Who Do Not Kill: A CategoricalApproach to ProportionalSentencing, 48 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1371, 1399 (2011).
107. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.
108. See id. at 157-58.
109. See id. at 16; see also Binder et al., supra note 106, at 1206 (arguing that the EnmundTison rule requires culpability as to the ensuing death, but recklessness would suffice).
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would very often capture any defendant who supplied or trafficked in an
opioid that resulted in death, even if the death was a product of overdose,
particularly if the drug was a highly potent opioid like fentanyl or a mixture
that included it. Nonetheless, those cases form an important part of an Eighth
Amendment proportionality doctrine that though deeply flawed"t0 -the
defense would likely consult in the case of an unintentional drug-induced
death resulting from opioid overdose for which capital punishment is sought.
C.

Culpabilityand the FederalDeath PenaltyAct

Finally, even if the constitutional and statutory arguments failed to
prohibit a capital drug-induced homicide prosecution, the Government would
nonetheless have to contend with the problem of culpability and mitigation at
capital sentencing.
First, even assuming that the Eighth Amendment does not forbid
imposition of the death penalty as a constitutional matter, the current FDPA
scheme contains culpability provisions that might well limit death-eligibility
in a drug-induced homicide. Section 3591(a)(2) states that, in a death penalty
case that does not involve treason or espionage, the Government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant:
(A) intentionally killed the victim;
(B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted in the
death of the victim;
(C) intentionally participated in an act, contemplating that the life of
a person would be taken or intending that lethal force would be used
in connection with a person, other than one of the participants in the
offense, and the victim died as a direct result of the act; or,

'

(D) intentionally and specifically engaged in an act of violence,
knowing that the act created a grave risk of death to a person, other
than one of the participants in the offense, such that participation in
the act constituted a reckless disregard for human life and the victim
died as a direct result of the act.

110. See Broughton, supra note 81, at 606-07 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,
439-41 (2008)).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(A)-(D) (2012).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 5
632

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 7 0: 611

These provisions were crafted to assure the constitutional minimum of
culpability in light of Enmund and Tison,11 2 but they also go further. In the
case of a drug-induced homicide, absent a specific intent to kill or to inflict
serious bodily injury, the latter two provisions would have to serve as a basis
for death-eligibility. That is problematic, for a variety of reasons.
For example, if section 3591(a)(2)(C) is the relevant theory, then
"contemplating" a death must equate to at least reckless indifference but not
specific intent. Federal courts have not been clear about the meaning of this
provision, though the Committee Report on this language appears to allow for
reckless indifferencell 3 and at least one federal appeals court has held that
"contemplating" a death means simply "to have in view as a future event" and
is something less than intent or knowledge.11 4 If section 3591 (a)(2)(D) is the
relevant theory, then distributing a lethal drug must be an "act of violence."
At least one federal appeals court has addressed the issue and found that "act
of violence" in this context requires the use of physical force," 5 which would
seem to preclude drug trafficking as the relevant underlying conduct.
Furthermore, each provision can plausibly be read to require that the
decedent be someone who did not participate in the underlying offense.116 If,
however, the victim died from voluntarily, and unlawfully, ingesting the drug,
a court could find that the victim was a participant in the underlying offense
and therefore the Government could not satisfy either of these threshold
culpability-eligibility factors. Of course, Congress could alter this result by
amending the FDPA to specifically include a drug-induced homicide as
satisfying the culpability-eligibility requirement. Indeed, if Congress were to
pass a new capital drug-induced homicide provision, this change in

112. See H.R. REP. No. 103-466, at 12 (1994).
113. Id; see also United States v. Basciano, 763 F. Supp. 2d 303, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(first citing H.R. REP. No. 103-466; and then citing Tison, 481 U.S. 137) (discussing House
Report 466 as finding that reckless indifference would suffice for § 3591(a)(2)(C) eligibility but
finding that Government had chosen not to proceed on a reckless indifference theory).
114. United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 997 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Contemplate,
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 438 (Random House 2d ed. 1997)).
Disclosure: I served as attorney for the United States during later proceedings in the Paul
litigation before the Eighth Circuit.
115. See United States v. Williams, 610 F.3d 271, 288-89 (5th Cir. 2010). Williams, a
commercial truck driver, transported seventy-four unlawful aliens through Texas in the back of
his truck but did not provide them with air conditioning. Id. at 275. As a result, nineteen of them
died. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that this did not constitute an act of violence that would trigger
death-eligibility pursuant to § 3591(a)(2)(D). Id. at 288-89; see also United States v.
Baskerville, 491 F. Supp. 2d 516, 522 (D.N.J. 2007) (holding that ordering a killing while
incarcerated is not an act involving the use of physical force and thus not an "act of violence").
Disclosure: I assisted the United States Attorney's Office in its prosecution of Baskerville.
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(C)-(D).
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culpability-eligibility would be a wise (and probably necessary) inclusion, so
as to avoid these difficulties under the existing FDPA.
Moreover, in light of current statutory mitigators, two distinct theories
could be troublesome for prosecutors seeking capital punishment in the
context of deaths resulting from an opioid overdose.
First, consistent with the principles set forth in Enmund and Tison, but
going farther than those cases go, the FDPA states that it is a mitigating factor
that although the defendant was a principal in the commission of the offense,
his participation was relatively minor." 7 This mitigator accounts for the fact
that, even though the substantive criminal law holds the defendant criminally
responsible, minor participation may mitigate the offense, even if that degree
of participation is insufficiently minor to categorically forbid capital
punishment pursuant to the Enmund/Tison rules. Second, the FDPA provides
a statutory mitigator where "[t]he victim consented to the criminal conduct
that resulted in the victim's death."" This second mitigator may seem
especially salient in the case of a homicide resulting from an overdose, where
the victim voluntarily ingested the drug, but federal courts have not had
occasion to apply it in the drug-induced homicide scenario.
Indeed, there is some question as to whether this mitigator could even
apply to such a situation, in which the victim presumably does not consent to
the conduct that actually kills her. In other words, if the mitigator applies only
to victim consent cases in which the victim wishes to die-for example, a
euthanasia-style killing-or in which the death-causing conduct is the object
of her consent (e.g., a duel), then it would likely not capture a drug-induced
homicide scenario that did not involve a suicide. Courts have held that section
3592(a)(7) does not apply merely because the victim consented to some illegal
activity, or even because the victim voluntarily engaged in conduct that
involved risks to his or her life.11 9 Rather, the victim must expressly or
implicitly consent to the actual death-causing conduct.1 20 Assuming the risk
of death is not the same as consenting to it.121

117. Id. § 3592(a)(3).
118. Id. §3592(a)(7).
119. See United States v. Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. 166, 171 (D. Conn. 1998) (first citing
§ 3592(a)(7); and then citing United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 804, 822-23 (E.D. Va.
1997); Beckford, 962 F. Supp. at 822 (interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(9), which has since been
repealed but which contained identical language to 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(7)).
120. See Beckford, 962 F. Supp. at 823-24 (citing Wuornos v. State, 676 So. 2d 972, 975
(Fla. 1996)) (suggesting that knowingly engaging in a duel could be sufficient to raise victim
consent mitigatory before fact-finder).
121. See Feliciano,998 F. Supp. at 171 (citing Beckford, 962 F. Supp. at 822).
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Nonetheless, in the universe of federal death penalty cases involving
drug-related crimes in which a death results, the drug-induced homicide case
would seem to present the best possible set of facts for application of the
victim consent mitigator, at least where the victim voluntarily ingested the
drug that directly caused her death (but probably excluding cases where, for
example, the transferor of the drug misrepresented the nature or potency of
the drug, or situations in which fraud or misrepresentation might be said to
negate the victim's consent). At a minimum, the force of the argument is much
stronger where the victim voluntarily engages in an act of self-harm that leads
to her death, as compared to engaging in a dangerous drug transaction but not
voluntarily ingesting the deadly drug. Even if the narrow language of section
3592(a)(7) did not strictly apply, the defense could present evidence of the
victim's voluntary conduct in mitigation using the catch-all factor pursuant to
section 3592(a)(8), which permits any evidence regarding the circumstances
of the offense that would potentially mitigate the sentence.1 22 Federal
prosecutors should therefore be prepared to face a claim for these kinds of
mitigation in such a case.
Still, however, these are merely mitigating factors. Proving any one-or
all-of them does not necessarily preclude imposition of a death sentence.
Whether any of them is sufficient to preclude the death penalty would depend
upon the weight given to the mitigator as compared to the weight given to
aggravating circumstances. If the jury determines that the aggravators
"sufficiently outweigh" the mitigators, then the death penalty remains
available. 123
IV. CONCLUSION

Both the general principles of the criminal law and Eighth Amendment
capital proportionality jurisprudence would likely permit both criminal
liability and imposition of the death penalty for a limited class of drug-induced
homicide defendants. Still, a capital drug-induced homicide prosecution
would present numerous legal and constitutional hurdles, and would, even if
eligibility could be established, challenge prosecutors to persuade a capital
jury that the defendant's culpability for the death was so significant as to
warrant the death penalty.
Consequently, the Attorney General-and those at the Justice Department
who would counsel him in his decision whether to seek the death penalty,
including the relevant United States Attorney may balk at pursuing the death

122. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(8).
123. Id. § 3593(e).
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penalty in many, if not most, such cases. That hesitation would be prudent
pursuant to the existing death penalty protocol at the Justice Department,
which requires the Department to consider all of the facts and circumstances
of the crime, including both aggravating and mitigating factors.1 24 It would
also be difficult to reconcile with a Department and Administration policy of
expanding the use of the death penalty for these types of cases. The most likely
chief purpose of the Memo-to encourage federal prosecutors to remain
aware of capital punishment options in drug-related cases and to recommend
the death penalty more often in those cases would therefore be served best
by focusing capital prosecution resources on those cases with the most
culpable defendants, particularly those with ties to criminal organizations who
engage in substantial drug-related criminality and who tend to employ violent
means in doing so.
Of course, some critics of aggressive criminal prosecution in opioidrelated cases claim that prosecutions will not solve what amounts to a major
public health crisis.1 25 Rather, the argument goes, effort and resources should
be expended on treatment, awareness, care, and prevention.1 26 There is much
to be said about these other approaches to the opioid crisis, approaches that
advisers to the President have acknowledged.1 27 It is almost certainly true that
criminal prosecutions alone will not solve the crisis. However, criminal
prosecution, even if insufficient by itself, can nevertheless form an important
element of a multi-prong attack on the opioid crisis, an attack that uses
treatment, prevention, and legal-including criminal-accountability as its
chief weapons.
Criminal prosecution may not solve the opioid crisis, but as part of a
comprehensive approach to combating it, criminal prosecution can seek moral
condemnation from the political community of those who use opioids-often
for personal gain or profit to prey upon vulnerable populations. It can hold

124. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 31, § 9-10.140 (last updated Apr. 2011).
125. See, e.g., Megan McLemore, How the JusticeDepartment Can Help Solve the Opioid
Crisis, NATION (Dec.
18, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the-justicedepartment-can-help-solve-the-opioid-crisis; Lloyd Sederer, We Can't Arrest Our Way Out of
Addiction, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 30, 2017, 2:20 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/civilwars/articles/2017-11-30/jeff-sessions-new-war-on-drugs-is-the-wrong-way-to-fix-the-opioidcrisis; Alyssa Stryker, The Police Will Not End the Opioid Epidemic, DRUG POL'Y ALLIANCE
(June 13, 2017), http://www.drugpolicy.org/blog/police-will-not-end-opioid-epidemic. For
thoughtful observations about the role of criminal law, while still emphasizing treatment and
awareness, see generally Rothberg & Stith, supra note 18.
126. See Rothberg & Stith, supra note 18, at 305-07; McLemore, supra note 125; Sederer,
supra note 125; Stryker, supra note 125.
127. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION AND THE
OPIOID CRISIS, REPORT 12-18 (2017).
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accountable, and subject to public scrutiny, those who are aware of the grave
dangers to human life that the opioid trade creates. It can punish perhaps, in
limited and appropriate cases, even with death those who, with awareness
of the risks, deliberately ignore those risks and supply fellow human beings
with the very instruments of their ultimate demise.
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